OUR MODEL OF belief will be a simple one. A belief is represented by a sentence in some (regimented) language. Research done in Artificial Intelligence has recently lead to a revival of the logic of belief. It was felt that a clear distinction should be drawn between the explicit and the implicit beliefs of a reasoner [15, 19] . The former ones are those that the reasoner would assent to if asked and for which he has some kind of independent warrant. The latter ones are those that follow, by some specified logic, from the set of explicit beliefs.
Introduction LI, Representation of beliefs
OUR MODEL OF belief will be a simple one. A belief is represented by a sentence in some (regimented) language. Research done in Artificial Intelligence has recently lead to a revival of the logic of belief. It was felt that a clear distinction should be drawn between the explicit and the implicit beliefs of a reasoner [15, 19] . The former ones are those that the reasoner would assent to if asked and for which he has some kind of independent warrant. The latter ones are those that follow, by some specified logic, from the set of explicit beliefs.
We distinguish a belief base, the set of explicit beliefs, from a belief set. A belief set is closed under logical consequences, it is a theory in the logician's sense. In general, we conceive of belief sets as generated by belief bases. Let us say that H is a belief base for the belief set K if and only if K is the set of all logical consequences of//, i.e., if K= Cn{H).
We must make a decision what to count as a belief state. A belief state is that kind of thing, pre-theoretically understood, which is changed when we change our beliefs. As we cannot read off from a belief set K which beliefs in it are the explicit ones, a belief state cannot be just a belief set. Should we say that a belief state is modelled by a belief base HI Of course, we then have no problem in generating the full belief set, provided we have fixed an appropriate logic Cn. However, as we shall see, there is a dynamical problem with this conception. In the sort of changes we shall consider, we cannot satisfy two desiderata at the same time: the desideratum that the changed belief state can be characterized by a belief base, and the desideratum that this belief base contains the set of explicit beliefs after the change has been effected. This is an unpleasant state of affairs which we shall have to put up with in this paper. Giving an answer to our question, we say that a belief state is a pair (if, K) such that if is a belief base for K. However, the reader be warned that our change operations are not making belief states out of belief states in response to a certain input. We shall explain this in the next section.
Before doing that, let us delineate the object language and its logic. The logic of belief change, and especially the theory of epistemic entrenchment, has been discussed for a language with the expressiveness of propositional logic, including all its connectives -», A, V, -• and <-•, as well as the truth and falsity constants T and _L. In contrast to this, we will aim at reducing the linguistic prerequisites. Our considerations are to apply also to systems using severely restricted languages, as encountered e.g. in inheritance nets or truth (reason) maintenance systems.
Correspondingly, the logic governing our language has to obey only structural rules. We require that it be reflexive, monotonic, transitive, and compact. We refer to our logic either as a consequence operator Cn or as an inference relation h, with the usual understanding that 0 e Cn{H) iff if h</>. In the first notation our four requirements become
(R) if C Cn(H) (M) If H C if' then Cn(H) C Cn{H') (T) Cn(Cn(H)) C Cn(H) (C) If 0 € Cn(H) then <p e Cn{H
r ) for some finite subset if' of H When linking our considerations to earlier work, we shall make use of connectives. Then the logic is further supposed to be supraclassical, i.e., what follows classically from a given premise set should follow from it in Cn. We also assume that Cn satisfies the deduction theorem.
Dynamics
A belief change occurs if a belief state is changed in order to accommodate it to a certain input. In the case we are going to deal with, the input comes in the form of (explicit) beliefs. In the research program initiated by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson ([3] ; for excellent surveys, see [7] and [17] ), belief states are identified with belief sets, and inputs are single sentences. Still working in broadly the same research program, Fuhrmann [5, 6] and Hansson [10, 11, 12] offer modellings for two important generalizations. They investigate what happens when belief states are modelled as belief bases (with belief sets as special cases) and when the input comes in sets of sentences (with singletons as special cases). In short, they generalize the theory of belief change to base changes and multiple changes. It is clear from the very beginning that the idea of base change is indeed compelling. True, it is reasonable to say that what an agent really believes is the belief set K, including the full set of his implicit beliefs. But it is at least as reasonable to think of belief change operations as acting on the set of explicit beliefs alone. After all, merely implicit beliefs have a secondary status, they are derived from the explicit ones. And if some of the explicit beliefs they depend on should have to give way, so should they! What counts in belief revision is the explicit beliefs, and later we shall provide for the possibility that they count in varying degrees. This is a foundationalist picture of belief revision and contrasts with the coherentist picture predominant in the current theory of belief revision [8, 14] . We will endorse the philosophy of base change in this paper.
Again, it is a good idea to be ready for set-like inputs. But this issue does not seem to have the same philosophical force as base contraction. Philosophically, base change is an alternative to theory change, while multiple change is just an extension of singleton change. There seems to be no intimate connection between these two kinds of deviation from the original framework of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson. However, we shall argue that multiple belief changes play a significant role in the analysis of base changes.
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L3. Three types of belief change
The simplest type of belief change is the addition of a new belief <j>\ (or a set of beliefs) which is consistent with the old beliefs. In this case, we have no problem in identifying the relevant operations. We can effect theory change through base change. Using the symbol '+', we define consistent additions as follows:
Notice that has two different meanings here, depending on whether its first argument is supposed to be a belief base or a belief set. It is obvious how to generalize these definitions when the input comes in sets. However, as the generalization will be far from obvious in the remaining cases, we shall restrict ourselves to singleton inputs in the rest of this section.
The operation of accommodating a belief state to some input is considerably more difficult if the latter is inconsistent with the former. In this case, it is usually held that consistency should act as an integrity constraint for our belief system. For such beliefcontravening additions, we shall adopt the following idea: In order to rationally include 0 into the set H (or K) of your beliefs, first make H (or K) consistent with 0, i.e., recant the commitment to -"•</>, and then add 0 consistently to the resulting set. It is common to use the term 'revision 9 to cover both consistent and belief-contravening additions, and to use the symbols V for revisions and ' for contractions. The above idea which is credited to Isaac Levi in the literature then becomes: This is the Levi identity, in its two versions for base and for theory change. One may think that the Levi identity is not of much help as long as we do not know how the contraction operation -behaves. This is right, but still it reduces the problem of finding suitable revision operations to the problem of finding suitable contraction operations. Philosophically, contraction appears to be the more fundamental operation. Like most authors in belief revision, we shall follow Levi's advice and concentrate on the study of belief contractions in the following.
1
What is this fundamental interesting operation called 'contraction'? The contraction of a set of beliefs with respect to an input sentence 0 is a subset of the original beliefs which does not logically imply 0. (Tn a sense, "input sentences" for contractions are rather "output sentences".) In case we start with a belief set K, we should end up with another belief set K-0 which is logically closed again. In contrast to the case of additions, we do not want to stipulate that the contracted belief set K-0 can always be identified with the set of logical consequences of a new belief base 77-0. We will explain why presently.
The basic idea of minimal change
When forced to perform a belief change, it seems a rational maxim to preserve as many of the most important beliefs as possible. Many writers have embraced such a condition of minimal change (minimum mutilation, maximal conservativity, informational economy) for many different purposes [18] . We will use the label 'minimal change approach' as a proper name for an account of belief revision which covers at least maxichoice, full, and partial meet contraction in the sense of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson [3] . This is the basic idea of minimal change: In order to contract a belief base 77 (or a belief set K) with respect to 0, look at the maximal subsets of 77 (of K) which do not imply 0. Since every piece of information is valuable, no gratuitous loss of beliefs is tolerated. As a first shot, then, we say that a set 77, of beliefs is better than, or preferred to, a set H 2 , relative to the belief base 77, if 77, preserves more explicit beliefs than 77 2 , that is, if 77^ n 77 is a proper subset of 77, n 77. In this case we write 77 2 < 77,. If 77, and 77 2 are subsets of 77, this of course reduces to 77 2 C77,. Proper inclusion is a crude preference relation for sets of beliefs, but it is the bestbecause the only-thing we can do, as long as the syntactical structure of the belief base is supposed to be the only information available for belief change. We write HAcf) for the set of all -<-maximal or "best" subsets of H which fail to imply 0. As we shall presently consider more sophisticated preference relations -<, we occasionally use Alchourron and Makinson's [1] notation Hlcj) rather than HA<p in order to mark the cases where •< is supposed to be fixed as proper inclusion (relativized to H).
L5. Base contraction
In the following, the term 'base contraction' is not to be taken literally. What is changed is the theory K -Cn{H) generated by a base H. But how the theory is changed depends on the way it is axiomatized, on the structure of H. For instance, while H -{p,q} and H' -{pAq} generate the same theory K, we expect that K-p contains q if K is axiomatized by //, but that q is lost if K is axiomatized by H\ In the latter case, q is inseparable from p.
The minimal change approach is afflicted with a decisive difficulty. In general, there is more than one solution to the minimal change problem, i.e., more than one maximal set of beliefs which does not imply <p. The point is that there is usually more than just one member in HAfy. What then to do? We adopt an egalitarians's point of view. All elements of HA(p are to be treated equally.
The hold or credulous option is maxichoice base change: In order to eliminate <p from K, choose one element of HAcj) at random, and close under Cn. Being maximally conservative, maxichoice contraction comes as close to the idea of minimal change as possible. However, if we do not have any tie-breaking information to govern the choice of some particular element of HA(j), there is no guarantee that the randomizing function y selects "the right" one. Believers do not play dice. The arbitrariness of maxichoice contractions is avoided by the next model for belief revision.
The skeptical option is meet base change: In order to eliminate (j) from K, take all the elements of HA(j), then close each under Cn, and finally take the intersection.
DEFINITION 2. For any base H for K, the meet contraction over K determined by H is given by if/eK~(/> iff HQ and H'r-y for every
H'eHAfy, or \-(f) and yeK.
Meet contractions depart from the idea of minimal change, because the intersection of several maximal non-implying subsets under -< is not itself a maximal non-implying subset under <. However, a symmetrical consideration of each element of HA<p is required by our decision to let in no other information than is encoded in the structure of the explicit beliefs. Opting for meet contraction thus means adhering to the equality of rights of the members in HAQ. Alchourron and Makinson [1] have shown that meet contractions make good sense only if either < allows for finer discriminations than C or H is a non-theory. If we have only syntactical information at our disposal, i.e., if every datum in the belief base carries the same epistemic weight, then it is essential for the following constructions that we have a differentiation between explicit and implicit beliefs. In this case the distinction is not only desirable intuitively, but also a technical prerequisite.
It would not be quite right to characterize our proposals as or K-{pAq) -Cn{{q}), while meet would give us K-{pAq)-Cn{Qi). Neither of these solutions seems satisfactory. Intuitively, K-^(pAq)-Cn({pVq}) would be good. Even after conceding that one of p and q may be false, we should still cling to the belief that the other one is true. But H'={pVq} is no base which can be constructed naturally from H-it certainly does not record any explicit belief. We are faced with a deep-seated dilemma. Either we must give up the philosophy of base changes which identifies the elements of a belief base with explicit beliefs, or else violate the methodological principle of categorial matching which requires that the result of a belief change should be of the same format as the initial representation of our beliefs. 3 In this paper we are going to stick to the interpretation of bases as explicit beliefs. With a heavy heart, we forgo the aim of getting {K-fa H-(j)) from (K 9 H) and stay content with the more modest aim of getting K-0 from K with the help of the belief base H. We assume that the belief base H and the ordering -< of its subsets induced by the idea of minimal change are relevant, and indeed all that is relevant, for the construction of from K, but neither H nor the ordering of its subsets will get revised itself. Pictorially, instead of the desirable transition (K,H,<) A (K-0, H-0, <*) we will study the transition K t-? K-0. In particular, there will be no suggestion as to the contents of H-0.
Multiple contraction
When the input comes in sets, we are presented with two different kinds of contraction. The task of a pick contraction is to discard at least one element of a set 5, while the task of a bunch contraction is to discard each element of a set S, both times with minimal mutilation of the original belief state. Notice that HA^y) = //A(0A^). But there are no interesting analogues for HA[<j),y/]. It seems that pick contractions with respect to finite sets are reducible to contractions of conjunctions, but that bunch contractions cannot easily be reduced to singleton contractions. 5 The concepts of maxichoice and meet contraction determined by a belief base can be generalized naturally to cover pick and bunch contractions as well. As the case of maxichoice contractions is entirely analogous, we restrict ourselves to meet contractions. Borrowing Fuhrmann's [5] 
Prioritization
At the end of Section 1. 4 we expressed some dissatisfaction with the crudeness of the preference relation afforded there. This crudeness was due to our assumption that we only have syntactical information governing changes of belief. Now let us suppose that we do have more information. In every realistic situation, the elements of a belief base will differ in epistemic weight. Some of them are more important, more relevant, more plausible, more valuable, or more certain than others. Without fixing the precise interpretation, we can model this by a weak ordering (an asymmetric and modular 6 relation) <3 of the elements of //. The strict relation <3 may be thought of as the asymmetric part of a transitive and connected relation <l, or as being determined by an assignment of real numbers to the elements of H. The modularity of <1 essentially means that the relation XI of incomparability (</> X y iff neithe <j) < y nor y < </ >) is an equivalence relation and can thus be regarded as the relation of being tied or identical.
After Nebel [21], we understand by a level of priority (in NebePs terms, a "degree of epistemic relevance") in a base H an equivalence class in H with respect to X3. Levels of priority will be denoted by 0, where (p is an arbitrary representative of {y EH\ y\X\(f)}. A level of priority <f) is higher than a level of priority y/, in symbols y<i<j), iff y<i(p. It is clear that the ordering <1 between levels of priority is well-defined. The ordering < of H generates a new ordering -< of the powerset of //, and indeed a new ordering of all sets of sentences: 
DEFINITION 4. H'<H" iff there is a level of priority (p in H such that H'n(j) C H"C\ty and for all higher levels of priority y in H we have Hoy
It is easy to check that H'<H"
just in case there is a (p in H"-H' such that y/<!0 for all y/ in H'-H". Definition 4, and in fact the entire method of prioritized base contraction, is very much in line with Reseller's "plausibility-tropic" Fundamental Rule of Presumption: "A positive presumption always favors the most plausible contentions among the available alternatives. It must stand until set aside by something yet more plausible..."
7 [24, p.55 ] From now on, HA<p and HA [S] again denote the set of all maximal or "best" subsets of H which fail to imply 0, or respectively, any element of [5] , but maximality is now judged by the new preference relation <. These concepts generalize Alchourron and Makinson's set Hl(j) which does not provide for differences in epistemic weight. If a belief base is not prioritized, i.e., if < is empty, then < coincides with C (relativized to //), and we get the so-called full meet base contraction as a limiting case. The basic idea of prioritized base contraction (Nebel) is to focus on HAcp when looking for the rational way of discarding </ >. This is a reinterpretation of what we called meet contraction in Definition 2. Although it would in the case of (genuinely) prioritized belief bases be somewhat more suggestive to talk of "rational choices" or "best solutions" or "optimal selections" we shall continue to say that we follow the basic idea of minimal change.
The relation we have generated has the following properties: Proof Irreflexivity, transitivity, base-specificity and the maximizing property follow trivially from Definition 4.
Stopperedness: Assume that Cn{H)C\S-% and that < is conversely well-founded. Since <3 is assumed to be modular, <3 over the levels of priority is a converse well-ordering, and thus conversely isomorphic to a unique ordinal T. Every level of priority y/ can be associated with a unique ordinal <7<r, with smaller ordinals marking higher levels of priority. The level of priority with rank number o will be denoted y/o. If G<T and Ha is a set such that Cn(Ho) 0 5=0, then let Ha be an arbitrary inclusion maximal subset of \jfa such that Cn(Ha U //£)nS=0. By the compactness and monotonicity of Cn, such Ho's are easily shown to exist. They enter into our construction of H" for stopperedness as follows:
Ha+\ -HaU Ha Ha -|J {H P : p<o) for limit ordinals <x Finally, we put H" = |J {Ha: cr<r}. It is clear from the construction that either H'<H" or H" = H\ and that H" is in HA\S\ And it follows from the compactness and monotonicity of Cn that for every <7<r, Cn(Ha)nS = 0, and thus that Cn(H")nS = 0. This completes the proof of the stopperedness of <. If < is not required to be well-founded, then -< need not be stoppered, even in the case of a singleton S. We consider a propositional language with denumerably many atoms p, q p q" q 3 , q 4 , ... and the belief base H = {qVq^: ij = 1,2,3 9 In the following we shall abstract from the special origin of the preference relation < between subsets of //, that is, from the fact that -< was generated from <1 by the above construction. Instead we shall just draw on the properties of < mentioned in Observation 1. In particular, we assume that -< is stoppered. Our level of generality thus lies somewhere between that of Nebel [20, 21] and that of Hansson [12] who studies the still more abstract tool of selection functions. We shall always point out which of the properties we need for which of the things to prove.
Generalizing our notion of preference a bit, we say that a set 3f ] of sets of sentences is better than (or preferred to) a set J~T 2 
Epistemic entrenchment
The concept of epistemic entrenchment has turned out to be a natural and fruitful instrument for the analysis of belief change [7, 8, 9, 16, 25, 26, 27] . 'Epistemic entrenchment' is just another word for comparative retractability. Intuitively, <p<y/ means that it is easier to discard </ > than to discard y/. We may call this the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment. Below we shall offer two interpretations of this idea in order to make it more precise. The relation between epistemic entrenchment and prioritization in a belief base has been first investigated by Bernhard Nebel. Initially he claimed that the latter is "fundamentally different" from the former [20, p. 308] but recently he changed his mind in favour of an interpretation of epistemic entrenchment as a special case of prioritization [21, pp. 53, 68, 85 ]. We will join the former opinion in this paper. From the fact that 0 has a higher priority than y/ we may not infer that </ > is better entrenched than y/, nor may we rely on the reverse inference. 10 This is true at least when an entrenchment relation is built up from a prioritized belief base in what we shall claim is the most natural fashion.
The most conspicuous difference, however, is that epistemic entrenchment relations are to respect the logical relationships between the beliefs in question, a feature that is completely absent in the concept of belief base priorities. The basic postulates an epistemic entrenchment relation < has to satisfy are: Again purely structural formulations of (EE4) and (EE5) are possible by substituting 'there is a y/'such that y/<(j) (such that (jxy/Y for '!<</>' (for '0<T'). For the motivation and discussion of all these postulates, see Gardenfors and Makinson [9] and Rott [27] . Epistemic entrenchment relations are required to satisfy (EE1) -(EE30 in [27] , and in addition (EE4) -(EE6) in [9] . (In fact, Gardenfors and Makinson work with a non-strict relation < which can be obtained from the strict relation < by taking the converse complement.) Given a relation of epistemic entrenchment, how can we get a contraction function from it? For the principal case, where (j>eK and 0<T, the standard definition [9, 27] It follows from (EE2 T ) that K-0 according to Definition 6 is a subset of K -<j) according to Definition 5-whence the names. Lindstrom and Rabinowicz [16, Section 5] argue convincingly to the effect that given an epistemic entrenchment relation <, any reasonable contraction of K with respect to 0 should result in a belief set which includes the small and is included in the large EEcontraction.
The basic idea of epistemic entrenchment is as yet still very vague and ought to be made more precise. The first or competitive interpretation of it suggests to determine the relative ease of retracting a sentence by looking at the fate of <p and y/ in a direct competition between 0 and yf. It reconstructs epistemic entrenchment from observed contraction behaviour [9, 27] :
For any contraction function -over K, the epistemic entrenchment relation revealed by -is given by (jxyr iff y/e K^((j)Ay/) and <p e K -(0Ay/). Definition 7 yields extremely nice results when coupled with large EE-contraction functions over a theory K. If the contraction function -satisfies certain rationality postulates, then < as obtained by Definition 7 is a relation of epistemic entrenchment from which we can recover -with the help of Definition 5. And conversely, if < is a relation of epistemic entrenchment, then -as obtained by Definition 5 satisfies certain rationality postulates and permits a reconstruction of < with the help of Definition 7. Details of that interplay can be found in Gardenfors and Makinson [9] and Rott [27] .
Another virtue of Definition 5 is the following. Nebel [21, proof of Theorem 9] showed that entrenchment relations satisfying (EE1) -(EE6) can be used as prioritizations of belief .ve/.v in the sense that they yield, via Definitions 2 and 4, the same result as when applied in Definition 5. is inadequate in some applications. Still it is good to be prepared for this possibility. Another motive for modifying Definition 7 is that we want to avoid an explicit mentioning of particular connectives, in order to make the epistemic entrenchment approach applicable to restricted languages as encountered for instance in semantic networks. We take the motivation of Definition 7 seriously and suggest the following improvement:
11. An analogous applicability of entrenchment relations for so-called safe contractions is established in [26, Theorem 4(ii)]. Entrenchment relations are so wellbehaved that they appear to be appropriate for every contraction method without changing the results.
HANSROTT DEFINITION 8. For any contraction function -over K, the epistemic entrenchment relation revealed by -is given by (jxy/ iff if/ E K^-((j),y/) and (p g K~((p,yf).
This interpretation of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment builds on the concept of pick contraction. Let us now try to deal with prioritized base contractions in terms of epistemic entrenchment.
Prioritized base contractions as extended epistemic entrenchment contractions
We extend the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment to sets of sentences. From now on, \S)<{T)* is intended to mean that it is easier to discard some element of S than to discard some element of 7\ '[SJ^IT]' is intended to mean that it is easier to discard all elements of S than to discard all elements of T. We shall speak of extended epistemic entrenchment in the sequel, with the two types pick and bunch entrenchment.
Let us try to widen the competitive interpretation of epistemic entrenchment accordingly. For pick entrenchment, this is easy. The obvious suggestion is
{S)<^{T) iff TCK^-(SUT)
and SaK^(SUT).
But for bunch entrenchment, there is no sensible condition which can be formalized with the present means. 12 So we propose another understanding of-possibly extendedepistemic entrenchment. The second or minimal change interpretation of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment builds on the basic idea of minimal change. It reads 'is easier' as 'does not require as great an informational loss as' or 'sacrifices less important beliefs than'. Formally, preference is judged by the relation of Section 2. Let us define the following version of extended epistemic entrenchment:
We do not wish to employ unheard-of objects such as K~([S],[T\). DEFINITION 9. For any base H for K, the relation <^ of bunch entrenchment generated by H is defined by [S]«[71 iff for every H'C H such that Oi(/T)nT = 0 there is an H"QH such that H'<H" and Cn(H")nS
-0, and \i yf for every yf in 5.
The following equivalent formulation is sometimes more convenient: We spare the reader an analogous definition of pick entrenchment, and we do not want to enter into a discussion of the properties of Our first result is that meet contractions of prioritized belief bases allow an elegant characterization in terms of bunch entrenchment. In a sense, the definition involves maxichoice bunch contraction: yr is in K-0 iff for every 7 there is a 7' such that the maxichoice contraction of K with respect to 0 determined by H and y' is better than the maxichoice contraction of K with respect to 0 and yf determined by H and y On the other hand, Definition 10 characterizes meet contraction by single sentences, as shown in Observation 3.
OBSERVATION 2. Let H be a base for K, and <^ be the bunch entrenchment generated by H. Then [S]^[T] iff for every H'eHA[T\ there is an H"e HA [S] such that H'<H'\ and HA[S]
OBSERVATION 3. Let H be a base for K, -he the meet contraction
Epistemic entrenchment generated by prioritized belief bases
Given a prioritized base H for a belief set K, we now try to find a more familiar, i.e., non-extended, relation of epistemic entrenchment, without beforehand committing ourselves to a certain contraction method.
Positive relations of "epistemic entrenchment"
Let us for the sake of simplicity assume in this section that all members of H are of equal epistemic value, i.e., that there is no prioritization (empty <). A first idea of extracting an epistemic entrenchment relation from a base H for a belief set K is the following. Call a set H' a proof set for 0 iff H'\-(j). Then yf might be called more entrenched than 0 (in K~Cn{H)) if and only if for every proof set HQH for 0 there is a proof set H" (111 for yf which is "better than" H\ This is a positive interpretation of epistemic entrenchment, focussing on the ways to gain a belief. A variant of this idea is successful in the reconstruction of "safe contractions" of belief sets with the help of EE-contractions [2, 26] . But what does 'better than' mean, if we have no prioritization? According to the line of thought developed above, a proof set is better than another if it contains fewer explicit beliefs. That is to say that H" is better than H' if H"C H\ So our first idea amounts to putting 0 < y/ iff for every H'QH such that //'r-0 there is an //" such that H"CH' and H"Y-y/.
However, we shall see that this is not the right approach to the present problem. The relation defined satisfies (EE1), (EE2 r ) and (EE2 1 ), but neither (EE3 r ) nor (EE3 1 ). The same is true for other "positive" suggestions such as the weaker <p< yf iff for every H'QH, if /Tr-0, then H'\-yf, and there is an H"CH such that H"\-yf, but H"\i §.
The main fault of these positive relations is that they do not conform to the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment. In order to judge the relative entrenchments of 0 and yf in meet contractions of belief bases, we have to look at the subsets of H which do not entail 0 or yf, rather than at the proof sets for 0 or y/.
Epistemic entrenchment from belief bases: a negative interpretation
We return to the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment. As it happens, the competitive and the minimal change interpretation of it can be unified in the present case. For our official definition, we employ the latter one: So y/ is more entrenched than 0 if for every optimal way of discarding y/ there is a still better optimal way of discarding 0. More exactly, in terms of maxichoice contraction functions, if for every y there is a y' such that the maxichoice contraction of K with respect to <p determined by H and y' is preferable to the maxichoice contraction of K with respect to y/ determined by // and y. In the following, we trace some of the implications of Definition 11. In 5.3, we verify that Definition 11 generates a relation of epistemic entrenchment in the generalized sense of Rott [27] , but not in the standard sense of Gardenfors and Makinson [9] . Next, in 5.4, we show that for meet contractions the two interpretations of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment coincide. In 5.5, we compare Definition 11 with entrenchment relations obtained by combining suggestions from Rott [25] with the special preference relation < of Section 2. In Section 6.1, we show that meet contractions, which are EEE-contractions characterized by Definitions 9 and 10, can be interpolated by means of small and large EE-contractions based on the epistemic entrenchment relation generated by the base. Although the approximation cannot in general be strengthened to an identity, a perfect agreement can be attained in a number of important special cases, as is shown in Section 6.2.
A prioritized belief base generates a generalized, but not a standard relation of epistemic entrenchment
It is easy to verify that the relation < defined in Definition 11 has the following properties:
OBSERVATION 5. For every prioritized belief base H, the relation < generated by H satisfies (EE!) -(EE3 [ ) and (EE4) -(EES), but it does not satisfy (EE6).
That is, Definition 11 does not yield an epistemic entrenchment relation in the sense of Gardenfors and Makinson [9] , but it does yield an epistemic entrenchment relation in the less demanding sense of Rott [27] .
Proof ( The relation < generated in the counterexample to (EE6) is further discussed as Example 1 in Rott [27] . It is worth noting that here we have p<pVq although not p<\pVq. Moreover, if we add q to the base H, then the generated entrenchment relation < still fails to verify q<p-although we may well have q<\ p. We realize once again that prioritization and entrenchment are indeed two altogether different kinds of thing.
If pick contractions are formalized as in Definition 3, Definition 11 turns out to be tantamount to the first interpretation of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment as formalized in Definition 8. In the context of prioritized base contraction, the competitive and the minimal change interpretations of epistemic entrenchment coincide. Intuitively this result is just what one may expect. It is still interesting, however, because it shows the confluence of two formally quite different ideas. As shown in Observation 4, Definition 11 refers to ^-maximal non-implying subsets, i.e., to maxichoice contractions with respect to 0 and yf, but multiple contractions are not involved. On the other hand, Definitions 3 and 8 analyze epistemic entrenchment in terms of meet pick contractions (which could, however, also be presented as meet singleton contractions with respect to 0Ay/).
More ways to generate the relation of epistemic entrenchment
There are still more ways to arrive at the determination of epistemic entrenchment given by Definition 11. We follow a line of reasoning that has been proposed in the context of theory contraction. 5.5.1. First let us combine Rott's [25] way of constructing epistemic entrenchment from a preference relation over maximal non-implying subsets of theories with an understanding of 'better' as 'preserving more important beliefs'.
According to Definition 5 of [25] , 0<y/ if and only if for all K'eKl yf there is a K"e Kl0 which is at least as good as ^'(remember that Kl 0 is the set of all inclusion maximal subsets of K that do not imply 0). For the transition from < to < we take the converse complement. So 0< yf if and only if there is a K"e Kl<j) such that all K"e Kl i/Aare worse than K'. n But this is not yet satisfactory. Because we must allow for the possibility of elements in M(K)-\J {Kl x'X e & -Cn(($)} which are incomparable with respect to the preference relation under consideration, this condition seems too demanding. We should rearrange the quantifier phrases from 3 V to V3. 14 Our official proposal then is this: 0 < yr iff \i<j) and for all K' e Kl yf there is a K"eKl<j) which is better than K\ Now we recall the basic idea of prioritized base contraction: For sets K' and K" of sentences (in M(Kj), K" is better than K\ in symbols K'<K \ iff there is a level of priority in the base H such that at this level K" exceeds K\ while at every higher level K" is at least as comprehensive as K\ It should be noted that •< so defined is not a preference relation of the kind discussed in [25] , because it is not modular, i.e., its converse complement does not satisfy transitivity. Putting the last two definitions together, we have a new characterization of epistemic entrenchment which turns out to be equivalent to Definition 11.
OBSERVATION 7. Let H be a prioritized base for K Then the following two conditions are equivalent: (i) for every Ke Klyf there is a K"e Kl<f)such that K'<K", (ii) for every H'eHAyf there is an H"eHAfysuch that H' < H'\
13
I am cheating a little at this point. I substitute 'worse than' for 'not at least as good as 1 -a move which would obviously require connectivity for the relation 'at least as good as'.
